Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …

This paper presents theory and evidence on horizontal industry structure, focusing on situations where plant …

managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

of the typical American firm. Variable pay is usually touted as a way to provide incentives to managers whose interests … received much attention, but that is consistent with may of the facts, is selection. Managers and industry specialists may have … information about a firm's prospects that is unavailable to outside investors. In order to induce managers to be truthful about …

executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …

contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is … only rarely chosen in the experimental markets. This behavior is rational given that managers do not play according to the …