Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …

We study the joint determination of fund managers' contracts and equilibrium asset prices. Because of agency frictions …, investors make managers' fees more sensitive to performance and benchmark performance against a market index. This makes … managers unwilling to deviate from the index and exacerbates price distortions. Because trading against overvaluation exposes …

Stock prices react significantly to the tone (negativity of words) managers use on earnings conference calls. This …

Corporate managers who own a majority of the common stock in their company or who represent another firm owning such an … interest appear to be less constrained than managers of diffusely held firms, yet their power to harm minority shareholders …. Finally, there is little evidence that new organizational mechanisms have evolved to constrain managers who own large blocks …

Large-scale increases in discrimination can lead to dismissals of highly qualified managers. We investigate how … expulsions of senior Jewish managers, due to rising discrimination in Nazi Germany, affected large corporations. Firms that lost … Jewish managers experienced persistent reductions in stock prices, dividends, and returns on assets. Aggregate market value …