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Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464915
We study the joint determination of fund managers' contracts and equilibrium asset prices. Because of agency frictions …, investors make managers' fees more sensitive to performance and benchmark performance against a market index. This makes … managers unwilling to deviate from the index and exacerbates price distortions. Because trading against overvaluation exposes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458188
incentive to induce managers to pursue actions which increase the speculative component in the stock price. Our model provides a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468976
When there is uncertainty about a CEO's quality, news about the firm causes rational investors to update their expectation of the firm's profitability for two reasons: Updates occur because of the direct effect of the news, and also because the news can cause an updated assessment of the CEO's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012459779
Stock prices are more informative when the information has less social value. Speculators with limited resources making costly (private) information production decisions must decide to produce information about some firms and not others. We show that producing and trading on private information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463704
Large-scale increases in discrimination can lead to dismissals of highly qualified managers. We investigate how … expulsions of senior Jewish managers, due to rising discrimination in Nazi Germany, affected large corporations. Firms that lost … Jewish managers experienced persistent reductions in stock prices, dividends, and returns on assets. Aggregate market value …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012533315
Corporate managers who own a majority of the common stock in their company or who represent another firm owning such an … interest appear to be less constrained than managers of diffusely held firms, yet their power to harm minority shareholders …. Finally, there is little evidence that new organizational mechanisms have evolved to constrain managers who own large blocks …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012472048
This paper examines the effect of the benefits of corporate control to managers on the relationship between managerial … the acquiring firm increases, the interests of managers are more closely aligned with those of shareholders, reducing the … acquisition premium. At sufficiently high levels of managerial ownership, managers value a reduction in the risk of their …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473808
Stock prices react significantly to the tone (negativity of words) managers use on earnings conference calls. This …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457675
We present a model of a financial market where some traders are "cursed" when choosing how much to invest in a risky asset, failing to fully take into account what prices convey about others' private information. Cursed traders put more weight on their private signals than rational traders. But...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457443