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Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives

Benmelech, Efraim - 2008

Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464915

Uncertainty about Government Policy and Stock Prices

Pastor, Lubos - 2010

We analyze how changes in government policy affect stock prices. Our general equilibrium model features uncertainty about government policy and a government that has both economic and non-economic motives. The government tends to change its policy after performance downturns in the private...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462528

What Ties Return Volatilities to Price Valuations and Fundamentals?

David, Alexander - 2009

Stock and Treasury bond comovement, volatilities, and their relations to their price valuations and fundamentals change stochastically over time, both in magnitude and direction. These stochastic changes are explained by a general equilibrium model in which agents learn about composite economic...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012463086

The Time Series of the Cross Section of Asset Prices

Menzly, Lior - 2002

In this paper we propose a general equilibrium model that successfully reproduces the historical experience of the cross section of US stock prices as well as the realized history of the market portfolio. The model achieves this while addressing traditional concerns in the asset pricing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469492

Income Inequality and Asset Prices under Redistributive Taxation

Pastor, Lubos - 2015

Our simple model features agents heterogeneous in skill and risk aversion, incomplete financial markets, and redistributive taxation. In equilibrium, agents become entrepreneurs if their skill is sufficiently high or risk aversion sufficiently low. Under heavier taxation, entrepreneurs are more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457001