executive officers. However, firms are run by teams of managers, and a theory of the firm should also explain the distribution …

Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …

: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the …

This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of high-powered incentives for managers, and …

We study the joint determination of fund managers' contracts and equilibrium asset prices. Because of agency frictions …, investors make managers' fees more sensitive to performance and benchmark performance against a market index. This makes … managers unwilling to deviate from the index and exacerbates price distortions. Because trading against overvaluation exposes …

determines how changes in trade frictions affect allocative efficiency in an oligopoly model of international trade, decomposing …

and exit decisions in a dynamic oligopoly model (a la Bajari et al (2007)) and use it to analyse redesign activity in the …