Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …

We study the joint determination of fund managers' contracts and equilibrium asset prices. Because of agency frictions …, investors make managers' fees more sensitive to performance and benchmark performance against a market index. This makes … managers unwilling to deviate from the index and exacerbates price distortions. Because trading against overvaluation exposes …

incentive to induce managers to pursue actions which increase the speculative component in the stock price. Our model provides a …

We propose a new business cycle theory. Firms need to randomize over firing or keeping workers who have performed …

Using responses obtained through the Nielsen Homescan panel survey, we explore the differences between managers' and … non-managers' expectations and perceptions of inflation and unemployment. By and large, managers and non-managers exhibit … information provided in a randomized control trial. Finally, the inflation expectations of managers deviate systematically from …

We propose a model where investors hire fund managers to invest either in risky bonds or in riskless assets. Some … managers have superior information on the default probability. Looking at the past performance, investors update beliefs on … their managers and make firing decisions. This leads to career concerns which affect investment decisions, generating a …