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than its static analog. We then test the theory using monthly production targets of the Big Three U.S. auto manufacturers …
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oligopoly. This paper proposes a non-cooperative foundation for "Nash-in-Nash" bargaining that extends the Rubinstein (1982 …
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In this paper we present the results from a "corruption game" (a dictator game modified so that the second player can accept a side payment that reduces the overall size of the pie). Dictators (silently) treated to have the possibility of taking a larger proportion of the recipient's tokens,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012462011
Since the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act (1897) and the Sherman Act (1890), regulation and antitrust have operated as competing mechanisms to control competition. Regulation produced cross-subsidies and favors to special interests, but specified prices and rules of mandatory dealing....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012465754
Climate change is considered as one of the major global challenges. Although countries past and future contributions to the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere are different, all countries are affected, but not necessarily in the same way (e.g. rising sea levels). This is the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453114
Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal of the prize value to players. Second, she sets the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014247957
A menu description presents a mechanism to player i in two steps. Step (1) uses the reports of other players to describe i's menu: the set of i's potential outcomes. Step (2) uses i's report to select i's favorite outcome from her menu. Can menu descriptions better expose strategyproofness,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014322893