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Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464915
than its static analog. We then test the theory using monthly production targets of the Big Three U.S. auto manufacturers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466713
We study the optimal provision of insurance against unobservable idiosyncratic shocks in a setting in which a benevolent government cannot commit. A continuum of agents and the government play an infinitely repeated game. Actions of the government are constrained only by the threat of reverting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458032
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002111627
We model differentiated product pricing by firms that possess private information about serially-correlated state variables, such as their marginal costs, and can use prices to signal information to rivals. In a dynamic game, signaling can raise prices significantly above static complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012496143
oligopoly. This paper proposes a non-cooperative foundation for "Nash-in-Nash" bargaining that extends the Rubinstein (1982 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458024
We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers' incentives to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012479596
We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent with outsiders' expectations based on publicly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460961
Motivated by recent developments in the bounded rationality and strategic complementarity literatures, we examine an intentionally simple and stylized aggregative economic model, when the assumptions of fully rational expectations and no strategic interactions are relaxed. We show that small...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012473377
We analyze an infinite stage, alternating offer bargaining game in which the buyer knows the gains from trade but the seller does not. Under weak assumptions the game has a unique candidate Perfect Sequential Equilibrium, and it can be solved by backward induction. Equilibrium involves the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477163