Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 158
Cover Image
Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives
Benmelech, Efraim - 2008
Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464915
Cover Image
Production Targets
Caruana, Guillermo - 2006
than its static analog. We then test the theory using monthly production targets of the Big Three U.S. auto manufacturers …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466713
Cover Image
Finite mixture analysis of beauty-contest data from multiple samples
Bosch Domènech, Antoni; García Montalvo, José; … - 2004 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002111627
Cover Image
Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information : Implications for Horizontal Mergers
Sweeting, Andrew; Tao, Xuezhen; Yao, Xinlu - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021
We model differentiated product pricing by firms that possess private information about serially-correlated state variables, such as their marginal costs, and can use prices to signal information to rivals. In a dynamic game, signaling can raise prices significantly above static complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012496143
Cover Image
“Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining : A Microfoundation for Applied Work
Collard-Wexler, Allan - 2014
oligopoly. This paper proposes a non-cooperative foundation for "Nash-in-Nash" bargaining that extends the Rubinstein (1982 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012458024
Cover Image
A Theory of Income Smoothing When Insiders Know More Than Outsiders
Acharya, Viral V. - 2011
We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent with outsiders' expectations based on publicly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460961
Cover Image
On some geometry and equivalence classes of normal form games
Germano, Fabrizio (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001747481
Cover Image
Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection
Ederer, Florian; Min, Weicheng - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
How does lie detection constrain the potential for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210093
Cover Image
Consensus and Disagreement : Information Aggregation under (not so) Naive Learning
Banerjee, Abhijit V.; Compte, Olivier - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
We explore a model of non-Bayesian information aggregation in networks. Agents non-cooperatively choose among Friedkin-Johnsen type aggregation rules to maximize payoffs. The DeGroot rule is chosen in equilibrium if and only if there is noiseless information transmission...leading to consensus....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013190991
Cover Image
Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information
Grossman, Sanford J. - 1986
We analyze an infinite stage, alternating offer bargaining game in which the buyer knows the gains from trade but the seller does not. Under weak assumptions the game has a unique candidate Perfect Sequential Equilibrium, and it can be solved by backward induction. Equilibrium involves the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477163