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Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives
Benmelech, Efraim - 2008
Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464915
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Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information : Implications for Horizontal Mergers
Sweeting, Andrew; Tao, Xuezhen; Yao, Xinlu - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021
We model differentiated product pricing by firms that possess private information about serially-correlated state variables, such as their marginal costs, and can use prices to signal information to rivals. In a dynamic game, signaling can raise prices significantly above static complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012496143
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A Theory of Income Smoothing When Insiders Know More Than Outsiders
Acharya, Viral V. - 2011
We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent with outsiders' expectations based on publicly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460961
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Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection
Ederer, Florian; Min, Weicheng - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
How does lie detection constrain the potential for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210093
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Consensus and Disagreement : Information Aggregation under (not so) Naive Learning
Banerjee, Abhijit V.; Compte, Olivier - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
We explore a model of non-Bayesian information aggregation in networks. Agents non-cooperatively choose among Friedkin-Johnsen type aggregation rules to maximize payoffs. The DeGroot rule is chosen in equilibrium if and only if there is noiseless information transmission...leading to consensus....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013190991
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Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information
Grossman, Sanford J. - 1986
We analyze an infinite stage, alternating offer bargaining game in which the buyer knows the gains from trade but the seller does not. Under weak assumptions the game has a unique candidate Perfect Sequential Equilibrium, and it can be solved by backward induction. Equilibrium involves the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477163
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Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change
Angeletos, George-Marios - 2004
Global games of regime change -- that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it -- have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467670
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Financial Markets where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices
Eyster, Erik - 2015
We present a model of a financial market where some traders are "cursed" when choosing how much to invest in a risky asset, failing to fully take into account what prices convey about others' private information. Cursed traders put more weight on their private signals than rational traders. But...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457443
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Organizing for Collective Action : Olson Revisited
Battaglini, Marco; Palfrey, Thomas R. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
We study a standard collective action problem in which successful achievement of a group interest requires costly participation by some fraction of its members. How should we model the internal organization of these groups when there is asymmetric information about the preferences of their...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014226188
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Information Favoritism and Scoring Bias in Contests
Deng, Shanglyu; Fang, Hanming; Fu, Qiang; Wu, Zenan - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
Two potentially asymmetric players compete for a prize of common value, which is initially unknown, by exerting efforts. A designer has two instruments for contest design. First, she decides whether and how to disclose an informative signal of the prize value to players. Second, she sets the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014247957