The paper considers an oligopolistic industry in which pollution is a by-product of production. Firms are assumed to have emission permits that restrict the amount that they pollute. These permits are assumed to be tradeable and the paper discusses a structure in which the same set of firms...

In the strategic investment under uncertainty literature the trade off between the value of waiting known from single decision maker models and the incentive to preempt competitors is mainly studied in duopoly models.This paper aims at studying competitive investments in new markets where more...

We show that an environmental regulation such as a tax on pollution can act as a collusive device and induce stable cartelization in an oligopolistic polluting industry. We consider a dynamic game where pollution is allowed to accumulate into a stock over time and a cartel that includes all the...

In this paper we study the endogenous formation of cooperation structures or communication graphs between players in a superadditive TU game. For each cooperation structure that is formed, the payoffs to the players are determined by an exogenously given solution. We model the process of...

Although a mixed strategy can never be evolutionarily stable in a truly asymmetric contest, examples show that mixed strategies can satisfy the weaker criterion on neutral stability. This paper shows that such examples are rare, and, generically, a mixed strategy is unstable. We apply the result...