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Stock-Based Compensation and CEO (Dis)Incentives
Benmelech, Efraim - 2008
Stock-based compensation is the standard solution to agency problems between shareholders and managers. In a dynamic … managers to work harder, it also induces them to hide any worsening of the firm's investment opportunities by following largely …-valued while managers hide the bad news to shareholders. We find that a firm-specific compensation package based on both stock and …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012464915
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How to compensate physicians when both patient and physician effort are unobservable
Leonard, Kenneth Lynch (contributor);  … - 2000 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001518140
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African traditional healers and outcome-contingent contracts in health care
Leonard, Kenneth Lynch (contributor) - 2000 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001518343
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Dynamic Oligopoly Pricing with Asymmetric Information : Implications for Horizontal Mergers
Sweeting, Andrew; Tao, Xuezhen; Yao, Xinlu - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2021
We model differentiated product pricing by firms that possess private information about serially-correlated state variables, such as their marginal costs, and can use prices to signal information to rivals. In a dynamic game, signaling can raise prices significantly above static complete...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012496143
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A Theory of Income Smoothing When Insiders Know More Than Outsiders
Acharya, Viral V. - 2011
We consider a setting in which insiders have information about income that outside shareholders do not, but property rights ensure that outside shareholders can enforce a fair payout. To avoid intervention, insiders report income consistent with outsiders' expectations based on publicly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012460961
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Bayesian Persuasion with Lie Detection
Ederer, Florian; Min, Weicheng - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
How does lie detection constrain the potential for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a model of Bayesian persuasion in which the Receiver can detect lies with positive probability. We show that the Sender lies more when the lie detection probability increases. As...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210093
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Consensus and Disagreement : Information Aggregation under (not so) Naive Learning
Banerjee, Abhijit V.; Compte, Olivier - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2022
We explore a model of non-Bayesian information aggregation in networks. Agents non-cooperatively choose among Friedkin-Johnsen type aggregation rules to maximize payoffs. The DeGroot rule is chosen in equilibrium if and only if there is noiseless information transmission...leading to consensus....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013190991
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Sequential Bargaining Under Asymmetric Information
Grossman, Sanford J. - 1986
We analyze an infinite stage, alternating offer bargaining game in which the buyer knows the gains from trade but the seller does not. Under weak assumptions the game has a unique candidate Perfect Sequential Equilibrium, and it can be solved by backward induction. Equilibrium involves the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012477163
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Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change
Angeletos, George-Marios - 2004
Global games of regime change -- that is, coordination games of incomplete information in which a status quo is abandoned once a sufficiently large fraction of agents attacks it -- have been used to study crises phenomena such as currency attacks, bank runs, debt crises, and political change. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012467670
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Financial Markets where Traders Neglect the Informational Content of Prices
Eyster, Erik - 2015
We present a model of a financial market where some traders are "cursed" when choosing how much to invest in a risky asset, failing to fully take into account what prices convey about others' private information. Cursed traders put more weight on their private signals than rational traders. But...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012457443