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Altruism and relational incentives in the workplace
Dur, Robert A. J.; Tichem, Jan - 2013
This paper studies how altruism between managers and employees affects relational incentive contracts. To this end we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009739554
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Honesty in tournaments
Conrads, Julian; Irlenbusch, Bernd; Rilke, Rainer Michael; … - In: Economics letters 123 (2014) 1, pp. 90-93
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010396506
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Upstream collusion and downstream managerial incentives
Bian, Junsong; Lai, Kin Keung; Hua, Zhongsheng - In: Economics letters 118 (2013) 1, pp. 97-100
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009706863
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How do labor representatives affect incentive orientation of executive compensation?
Dyballa, Katharina; Kraft, Kornelius - 2016
Contrary to previous literature we hypothesize that labor's interest may well – like that of shareholders – aim at securing the long-run survival of the firm. Consequently, employee representatives on the supervisory board could well have an interest in increasing incentive-based...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011526742
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Output-based pay: incentives, retention or sorting?
Lazear, Edward P. (contributor) - 2003 - [Elektronische Ressource]
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001750022
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Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts
Chaigneau, Pierre; Sahuguet, Nicolas; … - In: Economics letters 157 (2017), pp. 14-16
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011847288
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Optimal incentive power for inter-team competition
Matsuzawa, Satoshi - In: Economics letters 239 (2024), pp. 1-4
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015076667
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Do big inequalities in executive pay hurt firm performance?
Chung, Richard; DeVaro, Jed; Fung, Scott - 2024
evaluates that literature, clarifies what tournament theory predicts about the relationship, identifies methodological pitfalls … relationship between pay disparity and firm performance. Tournament theory offers a unified framework that can explain an inverted …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015075389
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Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle : the multi-agent case with transferable utility
Evans, Robert; Reiche, Soenje - In: Economics letters 99 (2008) 3, pp. 611-614
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003726286
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Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle : the multi-agent case
Bester, Helmut; Strausz, Roland - In: Economics letters 69 (2000) 2, pp. 165-171
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001521833