Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts
Year of publication: |
August 2017
|
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Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre ; Sahuguet, Nicolas ; Sinclair-Desgagné, Bernard |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 157.2017, p. 14-16
|
Subject: | Executive compensation | Principal-agent model | Prudence | Risk aversion | Theorie | Theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Risikoaversion | Führungskräfte | Managers | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Managervergütung | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system |
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