This paper generalizes the frequently used Hotelling model for two-sided markets in order to determine the equilibrium market shares. We show that advertisement levels depend neither on the media price nor on the location of the media firm. An increase in advertising revenues does not change...

In the basic model of the literature on international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994; Rubio and Ulph 2006) the number of signatories of self-enforcing IEAs does not exceed three, if non-positive emissions are ruled out. We extend that model by introducing a composite consumer good and...

In the basic model of international environmental agreements (IEAs) (Barrett 1994, Rubio and Ulph 2006) extended by international trade, self-enforcing - or stable - IEAs may comprise up to 60% of all countries (Eichner and Pethig 2013). But these IEAs reduce total emissions only slightly...

Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove...

The purpose of this article is to analyze how competitive forces may influence the way media firms like TV channels raise revenue. A media firm can either be financed by advertising revenue, by direct payment from the viewers (or the readers, if we consider newspapers), or by both. We show that...

In this paper we show how an upstream firm can prevent destructive competition among downstream firms producing relatively close substitutes by implementing a price-dependent profit-sharing rule. The rule also ensures that the downstream firms undertake investments which benefit the industry in...

This paper studies within a multi-country model with international trade the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) when countries regulate carbon emissions either by taxes or caps. Regardless of whether coalitions play Nash or are Stackelberg leaders the principal message is...

Oates and Schwab (1988) consider an economy with mobile capital and jurisdictions that suffer from local pollution. They show that welfare-maximizing jurisdictions implement the first-best, if they take prices as given and have at their disposal a capital tax and an environmental standard....