Stable and Sustainable Global Tax Coordination with Leviathan Governments

Itaya et al. (2014) study the conditions for sustainability and stability of capital tax coordination in a repeated game model with tax-revenue maximizing governments. One of their major results is that the grand tax coalition is never stable and sustainable. The purpose of this note is to prove that there are conditions under which the grand tax coalition is stable and sustainable in Itaya et al.'s model

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Eichner, Thomas
Other Persons:	Pethig, Rudiger (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Theorie \| Theory \| Steuerwettbewerb \| Tax competition \| Steuerharmonisierung \| Tax harmonization \| Nachhaltige Entwicklung \| Sustainable development \| Globalisierung \| Globalization \| Internationale Wirtschaftspolitik \| International economic policy

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (7 p)
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 4909
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments July 30, 2014 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2482988 [DOI]
Classification:	H71 - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue ; H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013048825