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We show that Miller and Pazgal.s (2001) model of strategic delegation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative performance, is affected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the price equilibrium. The undercutting incentives generating this result are indeed similar to...
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(2015). We show that their conclusions are misled by the restrictive assumption that the extent of delegation to managers is … prisoners dilemma, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium entailing both firms hiring managers. At equilibrium, the more …
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