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On the (non) existence of a price equilibrium in delegation games with relative performance compensation

Kopel, Michael; Lambertini, Luca - 2012

We show that Miller and Pazgal.s (2001) model of strategic delegation, in which managerial incentives are based upon relative performance, is affected by a non-existence problem which has impact on the price equilibrium. The undercutting incentives generating this result are indeed similar to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011734216

On the collusive nature of managerial contracts based on comparative performance

Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 74 (2020) 1, pp. 12-18

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012590220

Strategic delegation under cost asymmetry

Delbono, Flavio; Lambertini, Luca; Marattin, Luigi - 2015

(2015). We show that their conclusions are misled by the restrictive assumption that the extent of delegation to managers is … prisoners dilemma, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium entailing both firms hiring managers. At equilibrium, the more …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011714314