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managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471137
respect to takeovers, states have incentives to produce rules that excessively protect incumbent managers. The development of … state takeover law, we argue, is consistent with our theory. States have adopted antitakeover statutes that have little … policy basis, and, more importantly, they have provided managers with a wider and more open-ended latitude to engage in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471028
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers' performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012468885
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012469645
This paper develops an account of the role and significance of rent extraction in executive compensation. Under the optimal contracting view of executive compensation, which has dominated academic research on the subject, pay arrangements are set by a board of directors that aims to maximize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470054