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The place of contract in organizational awareness: deconstructing process, market and connectedness

Scott, Susan V.; Paris, Carolyn - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2010

Throughout modern business history, contract has been used as an organizational technology that holds counterparties in formal or legally binding agreements. The proliferation of contract prompted the emergence of professional contract managers who played an important but relatively peripheral...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010744884

Forming Efficient Networks

Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2004

In this paper, we suggest a simple sequential mechanism whose subgame perfect equilibria give rise to efficient networks. Moreover, the payoffs received by the agents coincide with their Shapley value in an appropriately defined cooperative game.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247843

Bidding for the Surplus: Realizing Efficient Outcomes in General Economic Environments

Mutuswami, Suresh; Pérez-Castrillo, David; Wettstein, David - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2001

In this paper, we consider two classes of economic environments. In the first type, agents are faced with the task of providing local public goods that will benefit some or all of them. In the second type, economic activity takes place via formation of links. Agents need both to both form a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005247858

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

robust implementation. Robust monotonicity is strictly stronger than both Maskin monotonicity (necessary and almost … sufficient for complete information implementation) and ex post monotonicity (necessary and almost sufficient for ex post … implementation). It is equivalent to Bayesian monotonicity on all type spaces. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087384

Robust Implementation: The Case of Direct Mechanisms"

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2006

together with strict ex post incentive compatibility is sufficient to guarantee robust implementation in the direct mechanism …. Strict EPIC and the contraction property are also necessary for robust implementation in any mechanism. The contraction …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005087399

Efficient Bidding with Externalities

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David; … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2005

We implement a family of efficient proposals to share benefits generated in environments with externalities. These proposals extend the Shapley value to games with externalities and are parametrized through the method by which the externalities are averaged. We construct two slightly different...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005823915

Robust Implementation in General Mechanisms

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008545755

Rationalizable Implementation

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen; Tercieux, Olivier - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2010

We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008476247

Rationalizable Implementation

Bergemann, Dirk; Morris, Stephen - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2009

This note studies (full) implementation of social choice functions under complete information in (correlated …) rationalizable strategies. The monotonicity condition shown by Maskin (1999) to be necessary for Nash implementation is also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004998323

Dividends and Weighted Values in Games with Externalities

Macho-Stadler, Inés; Pérez-Castrillo, David; … - Departament d'Economia i Història Econòmica, … - 2008

We consider cooperative environments with externalities (games in partition function form) and provide a recursive definition of dividends for each coalition and any partition of the players it belongs to. We show that with this definition and equal sharing of these dividends the averaged sum of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005168502