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Identity Changes and the Efficiency of Reputation Systems

Wibral, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2014

Reputation systems aim to induce honest behavior in online trade by providing information about past conduct of users …. Online reputation, however, is not directly connected to a person, but only to the virtual identity of that person. Users can … therefore shed a negative reputation by creating a new account. We study the effects of such identity changes on the efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010884234

Re-Thinking Reputation

Mell, Andrew - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2011

Economic models of reputation make strong assumptions about the information available to players. In particular, it is … observe in the real world. We build a model of reputation with more realistic assumptions about the partial knowledge of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009291911

Career Concerns with Coarse Information

Bonatti, Alessandro; Horner, Johannes - Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University - 2011

This paper develops a model of career concerns. The worker's skill is revealed through output, wage is based on expected output, and so on assessed ability. Specifically, effort increases the probability that a skilled worker achieves a one-time breakthrough. Effort levels at different times are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009352220

Laws and Norms

Benabou, Roland; Tirole, Jean - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

This paper analyzes how private decisions and public policies are shaped by personal and societal preferences ("values"), material or other explicit incentives ("laws") and social sanctions or rewards ("norms"). It first examines how honor, stigma and social norms arise from individuals'...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009646323

Dynamic Incentive Contracts under Parameter Uncertainty

Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

We analyze a long-term contracting problem involving common uncertainty about a parameter capturing the productivity of the relationship, and featuring a hidden action for the agent. We develop an approach that works for any utility function when the parameter and noise are normally distributed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008727782

The Quality of Information in Electronic Groups

Bacharach, Michael; Board, Oliver - Department of Economics, Oxford University - 2000

-weighted information may be maximized by a different regime, in which all replying is anonymous. Reputation effects play a key role in our …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010604981

Coordination under the Shadow of Career Concerns

Koch, Alexander K.; Morgenstern, Albrecht - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

To innovate, employees need to develop novel ideas and coordinate with each other to turn these ideas into better products and services. Work outcomes provide signals about employees' abilities to the labor market, and therefore career concerns arise. These can both be 'good' (enhancing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005761666

Anti-Lemons: School Reputation, Relative Diversity, and Educational Quality

MacLeod, W. Bentley; Urquiola, Miguel - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2012

reputation for skill acquisition and labor market outcomes in an otherwise competitive market. We find that reputation effects …) that arises when schools can enhance their reputation by positively selecting their students. This leads to excess demand …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010633000

On Reputation: A Microfoundation of Contract Enforcement and Price Rigidity

Fehr, Ernst; Brown, Martin; Zehnder, Christian - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2008

price rigidity. Reputation powerfully amplifies the positive effects of social preferences on contract enforcement by … interactions, suggesting that it may aggravate price rigidities. Surprisingly, reputation in fact weakens the wage and price …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822329

The Economics of Credence Goods: On the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Reputation and Competition

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf; Sutter, Matthias - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2009

efficiency, we find that liability has a crucial, but verifiability only a minor effect. Allowing sellers to build up reputation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005822832