We study the impact of crossholdings on the efficiency of the standard auction formats. The ascending auction is not equivalent to the second-price auction. In a class of examples, the ascending auction is the only efficient standard auction format.

Theoretical models of information asymmetry have identied a tradeoff between the desire to learn and the desire to prevent an opponent from learning private information. This paper reports a laboratory experiment that investigates if actual bidders account for this tradeoff, using a sequential...

In an article published in this journal, Rapoport and Amaldoss (2000, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 42, 483-521) analyze symmetric and asymmetric investment games similar to two-player all-pay auctions with bid caps. In this note, we correct an error in their characterization of...

This paper contributes to the study of tacit collusion by analyzing infinitely reaped multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric oligopoly with capacity constrained firms. Under both the Market Clearing and Maximum Accepted Price rules of determining the uniform price, we show that when...

The competitive market model is a paradoxical. In perfect competition, agents cannot influence price: they only select an output quantity. Such passive behavior doesn’t conform to the intuitive notion of competition. This paper describes an experiment which demonstrates that near or even at a...

In a commonvalueauction in which the information partitions of the bidders are connected, all rings are core-stable. More precisely, the ex ante expected utilities of rings, at the (noncooperative) sophisticated equilibrium proposed by Einy et al. [Einy, E., Haimanko, O., Orzach, R., Sela, A.,...

When an incumbent firm is in charge of a distribution network, it accumulates information on the state of the network. This `common value' information creates a winner's curse during auctions for renewing the concession. The municipality contracting out the provision of the service trades off...

We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative)...

Nous considérons la vente aux enchères sous pli scellé au second prix d'un objet que chaque acquéreur potentiel évalue de manière « privée et indépendante ». Nous montrons que l'optimum ex ante d'un cartel, sous contraintes d'incitation et d'équilibre ex post des transferts, coïncide...

The pure exchange model is the foundation of the neoclassical theory of value, yet equilibrium predictions and models of price adjustment for this model remained untested prior to the experiment reported in this paper. With the exchange economy replicated several times, prices and allocations...