Corporate governance literature suggests that the relationship between CEO effort and outcomes such as firm performance is highly uncertain due to the influence of numerous organizational and environmental contingencies that are outside CEOs control. The major focus of this study is to determine...

This study investigates how CEO ownership concentration in S&P 500 companies is associated with compensation tied to social performance. My theory on how these two variables are connected is presented in the paper. I employ logistic regression on privately collected data on social performance...

This paper examines executive compensation in the subsidiaries of business groups in China. Analyzing a sample of China business groups (the so-called “XiZu JiTuan” in Chinese) from 2003 to 2012, we find convincing evidence of the use of Relative Performance Evaluation (RPE) in the executive...

The paper shows that, as owners accumulate larger stakes and hence become less risk-tolerant, their incentives to monitor management are attenuated because monitoring shifts some of the firm's risk from management to owners. This counterbalances the positive effect which more concentrated...

We consider a model of CEO selection, dismissal and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention...