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Determinants of In-group Bias: Group Affiliation or Guilt-aversion?

Güth, Werner; Ploner, Matteo; Regner, Tobias - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

In-group favoritism in social dilemma situations is one of the main findings of studies in Social Identity Theory. We investigate what causes the in-group bias: is it due to mere group affiliation or, alternatively, is guilt-aversion a possible explanation? We induce group membership in a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090588

Efficient Contracts for Digital Content

Regner, Tobias - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2004

This paper analyses efficient contracts for digital content, focusing on the music industry. It contributes to the quest for an efficient intellectual property rights environment for information goods. Moreover, it adds an interesting application to the field of behavioural economics. The model...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005077126

Why Voluntary Contributions? Google Answers

Regner, Tobias - Centre for Market and Public Organisation (CMPO), … - 2005

reciprocity when people are socially minded, but also generally by strategic behaviour to build up a good reputation. Efficiency …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005135226

Social Preferences? Google Answers!

Regner, Tobias - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

experimental literature we find evidence that tipping is motivated by reciprocity, but also by reputation concerns among frequent …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005012075

Do Consumers Pay Voluntarily? The Case of Online Music

Regner, Tobias; Barria, Javier A. - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

concerns for reciprocity. The resulting sequential reciprocity equilibrium corresponds to the observed pattern of behaviour. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090464

Is observed other-regarding behavior always genuine?

Matthey, Astrid; Regner, Tobias - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

We investigate to what extent genuine social preferences can explain observed other-regarding behavior. In a social dilemma situation (a dictator game variant), people can choose whether to learn about the consequences of their choice for the receiver. We ï¬nd that a majority of the people...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005090540

Do I Really Want to Know? A Cognitive Dissonance-Based Explanation of Other-Regarding Behavior

Matthey, Astrid; Regner, Tobias - In: Games 2 (2011) 1, pp. 114-135

explained by avoiding cognitive dissonance as in Konow (2000). Our experiment’s choice data is in line with this approach. In …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008839368

On the Independence of Observations between Experiments

Matthey, Astrid; Regner, Tobias - Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

attempts to shed some light on the independence of observations between experiments, if they are generated by the same subjects …. We analyze experiments with an allocation decision and find that participation in previous experiments tends to increase … the amount subjects allocate to themselves. Hence, independence between experiments cannot be presumed if subjects …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008512521

Screening, Competition, and Job Design

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These “high-performance work systems” are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008513084

Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs

Bartling, Björn; Fehr, Ernst; Schmidt, Klaus M. - Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) - 2010

In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543256