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Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, Ernst; Gaechter, Simon - Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, …
selfishness, there should be no cooperation at all. We also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among … cooperators. The intensity of these emotions is the stronger the more the free riders deviate from the group standard. Our results … provide, therefore, support for the hypothesis that emotions are guarantors of credible threats. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005760920
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Behavioral Constraints on the Design of Subgame-Perfect Implementation Mechanisms
Fehr, Ernst; Powell, Michael; Wilkening, Tom - In: American Economic Review 111 (2021) 4, pp. 1055-1091
We study subgame-perfect implementation (SPI) mechanisms that have been proposed as a solution to incomplete contracting problems. We show that these mechanisms, which are based on off-equilibrium arbitration clauses that impose large fines for lying and the inappropriate use of arbitration,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013502140
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Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, Ernst; Gaechter, Simon - 1999
selfishness, there should be no cooperation at all. We also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among … cooperators. The intensity of these emotions is the stronger the more the free riders deviate from the group standard. Our results … provide, therefore, support for the hypothesis that emotions are guarantors of credible threats. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010314841
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Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments
Fehr, Ernst; Gaechter, Simon - 1999
selfishness, there should be no cooperation at all. We also show that free riding causes strong negative emotions among … cooperators. The intensity of these emotions is the stronger the more the free riders deviate from the group standard. Our results … provide, therefore, support for the hypothesis that emotions are guarantors of credible threats. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781678
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A nation-wide laboratory: Examining trust and trustworthiness by integrating behavioral experiments into representative surveys
Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; von Rosenbladt, Bernhard; … - 2003
Typically, laboratory experiments suffer from homogeneous subject pools and selfselection biases. The usefulness of survey data is limited by measurement error and by the questionability of their behavioral relevance. Here we present a method integrating interactive experiments and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010300553
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The Role of Equality and Efficiency in Social Preferences
Fehr, Ernst; Naef, Michael; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2004
Engelmann and Strobel (AER 2004) claim that a combination of efficiency seeking and minmax preferences dominates inequity aversion in simple dictator games. This result relies on a strong subject pool effect. The participants of their experiments were undergraduate students of economics and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010334011
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A Nation-Wide Laboratory: Examining Trust and Trustworthiness by Integrating Behavioral Experiments into Representative Surveys
Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs; von Rosenbladt, Bernhard; … - 2003
Typically, laboratory experiments suffer from homogeneous subject pools and self-selection biases. The usefulness of survey data is limited by measurement error and by the questionability of their behavioral relevance. Here we present a method integrating interactive experiments and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262013
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Is Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human Altruism
Fehr, Ernst; Henrich, Joseph - 2003
In recent years a large number of experimental studies have documented the existence of strong reciprocity among humans. Strong reciprocity means that people willingly repay gifts and punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters with genetically...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262063
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Does Money Illusion Matter? An Experimental Approach
Fehr, Ernst; Tyran, Jean-Robert - 2000
Money illusion means that people behave differently when the same objective situation is represented in nominal terms rather than in real terms. This paper shows that seemingly innocuous differences in payoff representation cause pronounced differences in nominal price inertia indicating the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010262382
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Driving forces behind informal sanctions
Falk, Armin; Fehr, Ernst; Fischbacher, Urs - 2005
This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted towards the defectors but the latter also impose a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010267590