Showing 1 - 10 of 17
This paper presents a complete survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory. Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by various selection theories. We present all...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013124577
We study strategies with one–period recall in the context of a general class of multilateral bargaining games. A strategy has one–period recall if actions in a particular period are only conditioned on information in the previous and the current period. We show that if players are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013097029
Subgame perfect equilibrium in stationary strategies (SSPE) is the most important solution concept used in applications of stochastic games, which makes it imperative to develop efficient numerical methods to compute an SSPE. For this purpose, this paper develops an interior-point path-following...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840979
We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all actions chosen during...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012894605
This paper studies adaptive learning in the class of weighted network games. This class of games includes applications like research and development within interlinked firms, crime within social networks, the economics of pollution, and defense expenditures within allied nations. We show that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012944776
We study perfect information games played by an infinite sequence of players, each acting only once in the course of the game. We introduce a class of frequency-based minority games and show that these games admit no subgame perfect ϵ-equilibrium for small positive values of ϵ. Furthermore we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012978208
We consider n–player perfect information games with payoff functions having a finite image. We do not make any further assumptions, so in particular we refrain from making assumptions on the cardinality or the topology of the set of actions and assumptions like continuity or measurability of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013020588
We study the division of a surplus under majoritarian bargaining in the three-person case. In a stationary equilibrium as derived by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), the proposer offers one third times the discount factor of the surplus to a second player and allocates no payoff to the third player, a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013060916
Socialenvironments constitute a framework in which it is possible to study how groups of agents interact in a society. The framework is general enough to analyse both non-cooperative and cooperative games. We identify a number of shortcomings of existing solution concepts that are used for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151868
The literature on the computation of Nash equilibria in n-person games is dominated by simplicial methods. This paper is the first to introduce a globally convergent algorithm that fully exploits the differentiability present in the problem. It presents an everywhere differentiable homotopy to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014151872