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An activist view of CEO compensation
Baum, Alex; Hale, Robert; Morfit, Mason; Larcker, David F. - 2017
with these numbers is that they are static and do not reflect how pay changes with performance. Activist fund ValueAct … relation between pay and performance?• Are large “minimum” payments indicative of managerial abuse?• What insights does this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011870307
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Endogenous Selection and Moral Hazard in Executive Compensation Contracts
Armstrong, Chris - 2012
The two major paradigmsin the theoretical agency literature aremoral hazard (i.e., hidden action)and adverseselection (i.e., hiddeninformation). Prior research typically solves these problemsin isolation, as opposed to simultaneouslyincorporating both adverseselection and moral hazard features....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116385
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Peer group choice and chief executive officer compensation
Larcker, David F.; McClure, Charles; Zhu, Christina - 2019 - Draft: August 22, 2019
compensation has a negative association with future firm operating performance. However, significant variation in CEO talent and … future performance is mitigated when the firm has a high level of CEO talent, and exacerbated when the firm has low … talent motivations explain more of the variation in the future performance implications of peer-group choice than corporate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012065171
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Stock options and chief executive officer compensation
Armstrong, Christopher (contributor);  … - 2007
Although stock options are commonly observed in chief executive o±cer (CEO) compensation contracts, there is theoretical controversy about whether stock options are part of the optimal contract. Using a sample of Fortune 500 companies, we solve an agency model calibrated to the company-specific...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003782064
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Governance aches and pains : is bad governance chronic?
Larcker, David F.; Tayan, Brian - 2016
Institutional investors pay considerable attention to the quality of a company's governance. Unfortunately, it is difficult for outside observers to reliably gauge governance quality. Oftentimes, poor governance manifests itself only after decisions have been made and their outcomes known. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864693