We show how major shareholders can exploit their power over international organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are...

Over the past fifty years, barriers to international trade have decreased substantially. While the decline in protectionism since World War II has stemmed partly from unilateral changes in trade policy by countries, it also has been a result of agreements among countries to liberalize their...

International institutions that include an escape clause generate more durable and stable cooperative international regimes, and are easier to achieve ex ante. The escape clause is endogenous in a model of repeated trade-barrier setting in the presence of symmetric, two-sided, political...

We show how major shareholders can exploit their power over international organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are...

Preferential trade agreements (PTAs) limit member-states' trade policy discretion; consequently policy uncertainty is mitigated. Reductions in policy uncertainty stemming from accession to a PTA improve the resource allocation decisions of the voters and reduce deadweight losses from the need to...

This paper provides an original study into how democratization and globalization influence transnational terrorism - examining the motives of terrorists and how democratic institutions and international integration influence non-state economic actors. We employ a gravity model to investigate the...

We analyze major transitions in U.S. trade policy using a two-factor, two-good, two-country model, where domestic policy is the outcome of political bargaining between two parties representing each factor owner—globalists and protectionists. The dominant party sets the agenda, but parties must...

In an autocracy, the ruling elite allocates resources to unproductive contest in order to protect its power. This paper establishes that a flatter income distribution, a slow-growing or shrinking capital stock, and a decrease in the relative size of the workforce increases the likelihood of a...

This paper presents a two-player proactive response game: the targeted government first chooses its measures to weaken the terrorists, and the terrorists then choose the type of event - normal or spectacular - whose outcome is dependent on proactive responses and nature. Unlike previous...