The aim of this paper is to derive conditions under which either dictatorship or the rule of law are the equilibria of a post-constitutional game. It thus contributes to positive constitutional economics, i.e., the research program that is interested in explaining the emergence of constitutions...

This paper explores the conditions under which compliance with a social contract establishes an equilibrium in a society. It is assumed that society consists of two groups, one of which has a comparative advantage in using violence, whereas the other one has a comparative advantage in producing...

The Condorcet jury-theorem is derived from the implicit assumption that jury members may only commit one type of error. In binary decision situations however, two error types may occur, the probability of which is independent of each other. Taking this into account leads to a generalization of...

Legal Cost Insurance (LCI) is not only a device to reallocate risk, but also to enhance an insured's position in a settlement negotiation. The paper points out that this function of LCI is especially important in cases that have a negative expected value for potential plaintiffs. Hence LCI is of...

The papers show that Legal Cost Insurance (LCI) is a device to enhance potential litigants' bargaining position rather than to re-allocate risk. Being insured decreases the cost an insured party has to bear if settlement negotiations fail and the case goes to trial. This shifts the threat...