The violent and the weak : when dictators care about social contracts
Year of publication: |
2006
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Authors: | Kirstein, Roland ; Voigt, Stefan |
Published in: |
The American journal of economics and sociology. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 0002-9246, ZDB-ID 2936-1. - Vol. 65.2006, 4, p. 863-889
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Subject: | Verfassungsökonomik | Constitutional economics | Autoritarismus | Authoritarianism | Politische Unruhen | Political unrest | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Theorie | Theory |
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