We derive the optimal contract between a principal and a liquidity-constrained agent in a stochastically repeated environment. The contract comprises a court-enforceable explicit bonus rule and an implicit fixed salary promise that must be self-enforcing. Since the agent's rent increases with...

Under contingent fees the attorney gets a share of the judgment; under conditional fees the lawyer gets an upscale premium if the case is won which is, however, unrelated to the adjudicated amount. We compare conditional and contingent fees in a principal-agent framework where the lawyer chooses...

In this paper we report on a principal-agent experiment where the principal can choose whether to rely on an unenforcable bonus contract or to combine the bonus contract with a fine if the agent's effort falls below a minimum standard. We show that most principals do not use the fine and that...

Im Handel gewinnt die langfristige, strategisch fundierte Profilierung im Wettbewerbsumfeld zunehmend an Bedeutung. Dies gilt in besonderem Maße für Handelsunternehmen in vertraglichen Vertriebssystemen, die sowohl mit systemfremden wie auch systeminternen Betrieben konkurrieren. Hohe...

Die Verknüpfung der Planung und Implementierung von Marketingstrategien stellt insbesondere im Einzelhandel eine wenig beachtete Problemstellung dar. Häufig liegt hier jedoch ein Hauptgrund für das Scheitern von Strategiekonzepten in der Praxis. Der Verfasser untersucht diesen Problembereich...

Standard theories of corporate ownership assume that because markets are efficient, insiders ultimately bear agency costs and therefore have a strong incentive to minimize conflicts of interest with outside investors. We show that if equity is overvalued, however, mispricing offsets agency costs...