This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay … higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to …

This paper presents a market equilibrium model of CEO assignment, pay and incentives under risk aversion and … distorted by the agency problem as firms involving higher risk or disutility choose less talented CEOs. Such firms also pay … higher salaries in the cross-section, but economy-wide increases in risk or the disutility of being a CEO (e.g. due to …

performing agent must beat the second best to receive the winner prize. We analyze a tournament with two risk averse agents …

This paper analyzes the optimal response of the social insurance system to a rise in labor market risk. To this end, we … develop a tractable macroeconomic model with risk-free physical capital, risky human capital (labor market risk) and … (human capital) risk increases social welfare if the government adjusts the tax-and-transfer system optimally. Finally, we …

' performance. In this paper, we examine the relationship between uncertainty and incentives in which the risk-averse agent has the …

the results from the model to cast light on (i) the conflicting empirical evidence on the risk-incentives tradeoff found …