Who Benefits from Workers with General Skills? Countervailing Incentives in Labour Contracts
Year of publication: |
2004
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kübler, Dorothea |
Publisher: |
[S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Theorie | Theory | Vertrag | Contract | Qualifikation | Occupational qualification | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Humankapital | Human capital |
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