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Most theoretical or applied research on repeated games with imperfect monitoring has restricted attention to public strategies; strategies that only depend on history of publicly observable signals, and perfect public equilibrium (PPE); sequential equilibrium in public strategies. The present...
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An equilibrium in an infinite horizon game is called a finite state equilibrium, if each player's action on the equilibrium path is given by an automaton with a finite state space. We provide a complete characterization of this class of equilibria and provide a recursive computational method to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011082080
Repeated games with imperfect private monitoring have a wide range of applications, but a complete characterization of all equilibria in this class of games has yet to be obtained. The existing literature has identified a relatively tractable subset of equilibria. The present paper introduces...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004999295
Randomization is an effective way of extracting information from a limited number of observations, as random auditing shows. We employ this idea to support efficient outcomes in repeated games with imperfect monitoring, when information is severely limited. In particular, we show that efficiency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187158
The initially high performance of a socioeconomic organization is quite often subject to gradual erosion over time. We present a simple model which captures such a phenomenon. We assume that players are partly motivated by certain psychological factors, norms and morale, and they are willing to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187222
The initially high performance of a socioeconomic organization is quite often subject to gradual erosion over time. We present a simple model which captures such a phenomenon. We assume that players are partly motivated by certain psychological factors, norms and morale, and they are willing to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005465396
The present paper shows that the Folk Theorem under imperfect (public) information (Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (1994)) can be obtained under much weaker set of assumptions, if we allow communication among players. Our results in particular show that for generic symmetric games with at least...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005467426