"Less is More: An Observability Paradox in Repeated Gamess"

We present a repeated prisoners' dilemma game with imperfect public monitoring, which exhibits the following paradoxical feature: the equilibrium payoff set expands and asymptotically achieves full efficiency as the public signal becomes less sensitive to the hiden actions of the players.

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Year of publication:	2003-11
Authors:	Kandori, Michihiro ; Obara, Ichiro
Institutions:	Center for International Research on the Japanese Economy (CIRJE), Faculty of Economics

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	CIRJE F-Series.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Number CIRJE-F-246 19 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005187107