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We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011702816
This paper examines the economic impact of the 1979 labor strike against lettuce producer-shippers in the Imperial Valley of California. The theory presented suggests that formidable problems are encountered by agricultural labor unions in obtaining higher wages for farm workers. During the 1979...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005327764
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005327926
We prove by construction that ex post incentive compatible mechanisms exist in a private goods setting with multi-dimensional signals and interdependent values. The mechanism shares features with the generalized Vickrey auction of one-dimensional signal models. The construction implies that for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599375
Preferences may arise from regret, i.e., from comparisons with alternatives forgone by the decision maker. We ask whether regret-based behavior is consistent with non-expected utility theories of transitive choice and show that the answer is no. If choices are governed by ex ante regret and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599439
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012236173
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001503589
We investigate a model in which one seller and one buyer trade in each of two periods. The buyer has demand for one unit of a non-durable object per period. The buyer's reservation value for the good is private information and is the same in both periods. The seller commits to prices in each of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013122067
Consider a mechanism design setting in which agents acquire costly information about an unknown, payoff-relevant state of nature. Information gathering is covert. We investigate conditions under which (i) efficient implementation and (ii) full surplus extraction are Bayesian incentive compatible...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013098252
Policymakers often express concern that herding by financial market participants destabilizes markets and increases the fragility of the financial system. This paper provides an overview of the recent theoretical and empirical research on herd behavior in financial markets. It addresses the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012737708