Harsanyi and Selten (1988) have proposed a theory of equilibrium selection that selects a unique Nash equilibrium for any non-cooperative N-person game. The heart of their theory is given by the tracing procedure, a mathematical construction that adjusts arbitrary prior beliefs into equilibrium...

We identify the core as an appealing stability concept of cooperative game theory, but argue that the non-cooperative approach has conceptual advantages in the context of economic problems with externalities. Therefore, we derive a non-cooperative foundation of core-stability for positive...

We empirically test stability of climate change coalitions with the STAbility of Coalitions model (STACO). The model comprises twelve world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We apply the stability concept of internal and external stability to a cartel...

This paper compares stability of international environmental agreements for six different rules of coalition formation under very general conditions (any type of heterogeneity between countries). The rules can be interpreted as different institutional settings in which treaty formations take...

We analyze with an integrated assessment model of climate change the formation of interna-tional environmental agreements (IEAs) by applying the widely used concept of inter-nal & external stability and several modifications of it. We relax the assumptions of a single agreement and open...

Since the framework convention of Rio, actual environmental negotiations on climate change aim at inducing all world countries to sign global environmental agreements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Despite the past unsuccessful attempts, even current negotiations seem to pursue the same...

Oil and gas as the non-renewable resources are considered very valuable for the countries with petroleum economics. These resources are not only diffused equally around the world, but also they are common in some places which their neighbors often come into conflicts. Consequently, it is vital...

The objective of this paper is to investigate the usefulness of non-cooperative bargaining theory for the analysis of negotiations on water allocation and management. We explore the impacts of different economic incentives, a stochastic environment and varying individual preferences on players’...

Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong free-riding incentives. This paper explores how different technology spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentive structures to join and stabilise an international agreement. We...