We analyze a model of conflict with endogenous choice of effort, where subsets of the contenders may force the resolution to be sequential: First the alliance fights it out with the rest and – in case they win – later they fight it out among themselves. For three-player games, we find that...

In this paper we proose the infimum of the Arrow-Pratt index of absolute risk aversion as a measure of global risk aversion of a utility function. We then show that, for any given arbitrary pair of distributions, there exists a threshold level of global risk aversion such that all increasing...

We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out,...

We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out,...

We reformulate neoclassical consumer choice by focusing on [lambda], the marginal utility of money. As the opportunity cost of current expenditure, [lambda] is approximated by the slope of the indirect utility function of the continuation. We argue that [lambda] can largely supplant the role of...

We reformulate neoclassical consumer choice by focusing on γ, the marginal utility of money. As the opportunity cost of current expenditure, γ is approximated by the slope of the indirect utility function of the continuation. We argue that γ can largely supplant the role of an arbitrary...