This paper examines the existence and nature of competitive equilibrium with moral hazard. The more insurance an individual has, the less care will he take. Consequently, insurance firms attempt to restrict their clients' aggregate insurance purchases. If individuals' aggregate insurance...

This paper shows that, except in certain limiting cases, competitive equilibrium with moral hazard is constrained inefficient. The first section compares the competitive equilibrium and the constrained social optimum in a fairly general model, and identifies types of market failure. Each of the...

Through an extended numerical example, this paper develops a diagrammatic analysis of steady-state parking and traffic congestion in an isotropic downtown and provides systematic policy analysis. Unlike our previous work, the model incorporates curbside parking, garage parking, and...

In major cities parking costs typically exceed automobile running costs, while the time to find a parking spot and walk to work can be comparable to driving time. Yet models of urban commuting have ignored parking completely. The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of parking on...

We investigate the effect of information about congestion on participation and time-of-use decisions in a free-access delay system subject to predictable and unpredictable fluctuations in capacity and demand intensity. Expected welfare is greater with perfect than with zero information, while...

Braess and others have shown that creating a new link in a congested network, or adding capacity to an existing link, can raise total travel costs if drivers switch routes. We show that a paradox can also result when routes are fixed but users choose when to travel. As is true of the Braess...