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This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015223689
We analyze information design games between two designers with opposite preferences and a single agent. Before the agent makes a decision, designers repeatedly disclose public information about persistent state parameters. Disclosure continues until no designer wishes to reveal further...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014536851
This paper studies extensive form games with perfect information and simultaneous moves, henceforth called games with public information. On this class, we prove that all communication equilibrium payoffs can be obtained without mediator by cheap-talk procedures. The result encompasses repeated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015241883
This paper studies a mechanism design model where the players and the designer are nodes in a communication network. We characterize the communication networks (directed graphs) for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive compatible social choice function is partially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599469
We characterize the minmax values of a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal trade-off for the team formed by punishing players between optimization of stage-payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation. Amounts of correlation are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011073610
An observer of a process View the MathML source believes the process is governed by Q whereas the true law is P. We bound the expected average distance between P(xt|x1,…,xt−1) and Q(xt|x1,…,xt−1) for t=1,…,n by a function of the relative entropy between the marginals of P and Q on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011073630
An ambiguous statistical experiment is a set of joint probability distributions over states and signals. This note compares ambiguous experiments from the point of view of an ambiguity averse decision maker and extends the Blackwell (1951, 1953) ordering to this setting.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011147707
This paper considers dynamic implementation problems with evolving private information (according to Markov processes). A social choice function is approximately implementable if there exists a dynamic mechanism such that the social choice function is implemented by an arbitrary large number of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010832935
We characterize the min max values of a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal trade-off for the team formed by punishing players between optimization of stage-payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation. Amounts of correlation are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005043199
This paper characterizes the class of communication networks for which, in any environment (utilities and beliefs), every incentive-compatible social choice function is (partially) implementable. Among others, in environments with either common and independent beliefs and private values or a bad...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005561926