We study auction design when parties cannot commit themselves to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game and the buyers choose their outside option at all stages. We assume that the seller has a leading role in equilibrium selection at any stage of the game. Stationary...

We develop a model of lobbying in which a time and resource constrained policymaker first chooses which policy proposals to learn about, before choosing which to implement. The policymaker reviews the proposals of the interest groups who provide the highest contributions. We study how policy...

We consider an allocation problem with a finite number of objects, and agents that demand at most one of the objects. The study provides a characterization of a class of strategy-proof price mechanisms. A mechanism belongs to the class if and only if the price space is restricted in a special...

We study auction design when parties cannot commit to the mechanism. The seller may change the rules of the game any number of times and the buyers may choose their outside option at any stage of the game. A dynamic consistency condition and an optimality condition property are defined to...

We develop a model of lobbying in which a time and resource constrained policymaker first chooses which policy proposals to learn about, before choosing which to implement. The policymaker reviews the proposals of the interest groups who provide the highest contributions. We study how policy...

Climate change, security and cost of energy supplies, and the competitiveness of firms and economies have been focal points of the general political and economic policy debate in recent years. This article examines the choices in this field made at global level with the Kyoto Protocol and in...

Technology & Marketing Ventures, Inc. (TMVi) has developed a creative, integrated bi-partisan solution to jumpstart the American economy and create American jobs. To facilitate executing the plan, TMVi has architected and designed a focused collaborative network organization (CNO). The TMVi Tax...

A decision maker (DM) prefers to allocate a limited number of prizes to the highest-quality agents. She can learn about quality by reviewing some agents before awarding prizes. We introduce “Contests for Attention,” where agents make payments in competition for the DMs' limited attention. In...

I provide a brief introduction to the early literatures on Matching, Auctions, and Market Design.The design of matching markets and auctions has brought economic theory and practice together. Indeed, this is an area where microeconomic theory has had its largest direct impact. This is in part...

“King Solomon's Dilemma” is based on a biblical story and this can be considered as an allocation problem for an indivisible object among two players. An allocation is first-best if a social planner wants to assign the object without payment to the player whose valuation is the highest. We...