We examine alliances between asymmetric countries. We find that the results depend on the nature of the equilibrium. If the equilibrium is an interior one then, with an increase in asymmetry, the level of the alliance-wide defense good decreases and the divergence between the first best and the...

We examine alliances between asymmetric countries. We find that the results depend on the nature of the equilibrium. If the equilibrium is an interior one then, with an increase in asymmetry, the level of the alliance-wide defense good decreases and the divergence between the first best and the...

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient...

Dieser Beitrag untersucht den Begriff der Initiative in Strategie und operativer Kunst aus spieltheoretischer Perspektive. Wir modellieren dazu den Unterschied zwischen den beiden Wirkmechanismen der Initiative: der Einflussnahme auf gegnerisches Verhalten zum einen und der Beschneidung der...