Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans

We study how norms can solve distributional conflict inside a clan and the efficient coordination of collective action in a conflict with an external enemy.We characterize a fully non-cooperative equilibrium in a finite game in which a self-enforcing norm coordinates the members on efficient collective action and on a peaceful distribution of the returns of collective action.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Konrad, Kai A. ; Leininger, Wolfgang
Publisher:	Essen : Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI)
Subject:	Normbefolgung \| Gemeinschaft \| Verteilungskonflikt \| Krieg \| Trittbrettfahrerverhalten \| Spieltheorie \| Free-riding \| defence \| collective action \| distributional conflict \| war \| norms

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Series:	Ruhr Economic Papers ; 16
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
ISBN:	978-3-86788-010-7
Other identifiers:	534694020 [GVK] hdl:10419/26781 [Handle] RePEc:zbw:rwirep:16 [RePEc]
Classification:	D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D74 - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances ; H41 - Public Goods
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264689