I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many-to-many matching, marriage and matching with trading networks (trades). I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a...

I estimate the relative magnitudes of worker switching costs and how much the employer switching of experienced engineers responds to outside wage offers. Institutional features imply that voluntary turnover dominates switching in the market for Swedish engineers from 1970--1990. I use data on...

I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable-utility matching game. Consider data on matches or relationships between agents but not on the choice set of each agent. I investigate what economic parameters can be learned from data on equilibrium matches and agent characteristics. Features of a...

I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many-to-many matching, marriage and matching with trading networks (trades). I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a...

I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many-to-many matching, marriage, and matching with trading networks (trades). Computational issues are paramount. I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of...

I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable utility matching game. Consider data on matches or relationships between agents but not on the choice set of each agent. I investigate what economic parameters can be learned from data on equilibrium matches and agent characteristics. Features of a...