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Job Matching When Employment Contracts Suffer from Moral Hazard

Demougin, Dominique; Helm, Carsten - 2010

We consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth-constrained workers suffer from moral …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014044516

Existence of Myopic-Farsighted Stable Sets in Matching Markets

Doğan, Battal; Ehlers, Lars - 2023

We consider decentralized one-to-one matching markets with myopic and farsighted agents. We study myopic …-to-one matching markets …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014261524

Science and teaching : two-dimensional signalling in the academic job market

Schneider, Andrea - 2009

separating highly talented agents from the low talented ones. However separating that means signalling effort for the highly … talented becomes even more important in a two-dimensional signalling case. This attracts notice to time constraints. Under weak … without additional information compared to the onedimensional case. Considering this, the efficiency of the current two …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003865989

Gift-exchange, incentives, and heterogeneous workers

Non, Arjan - 2011

excessively strong incentives and a relatively high expected total compensation. -- reciprocity ; gift-exchange ; signaling game …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009261791

Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers

Non, Arjan - 2011

By incorporating reciprocity in an otherwise standard principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some, but not all, workers care more for their principal when they are convinced that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121201

Screening with Multitasking

Dinerstein, Michael; Opper, Isaac - 2022

What happens when employers would like to screen their employees but only observe a subset of output? We specify a model in which heterogeneous employees respond by producing more of the observed output at the expense of the unobserved output. Though this substitution distorts output in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014079145

Production Externalities, Congruity of Aggregate Signals, and Optimal Task Assignments

Hughes, John S.; Zhang, Li; Xie, James - 2015

In this paper, we consider the role of production externalities in the task assignment problem. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) suggest that complementarities available when agents are assigned to diverse tasks are necessary to overcome distortions in effort allocations caused by an inability to fine...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014067099

Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers

Non, Arjan - 2010

Using a formal principal-agent model, I investigate the relation between monetary gift-exchange and incentive pay, while allowing for worker heterogeneity. I assume that some agents care more for their principal when they are convinced that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045822

Gift-Exchange, Incentives, and Heterogeneous Workers

Non, Arjan - 2010

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014045826

Tenure, experience, human capital and wages : a tractable equilibrium search model of wage dynamics

Bagger, Jesper; Fontaine, François; Postel-Vinay, Fabien; … - 2014 - rev.

We develop and estimate an equilibrium job search model of worker careers, allowing for human capital accumulation, employer heterogeneity and individual-level shocks. Career wage growth is decomposed into the contributions of human capital and job search, within and between jobs. Human capital...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010254832