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It is found that the “Theory of Moves” is adequate in a Cold War scenario, with functionally equal participants, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The destabilization of normal incentive systems, under power and information asymmetry, is what prevents an equilibrium from being reached, as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010965563
How does opinion polarization over matters of moral conviction affect the legislative outcome of parliamentary institutions? Analysis reveals that in the relatively common case, in which a party's voting power is positively correlated with the public support of the convictions it represents, if...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251897
players and spillovers to non-members. I introduce a sharing rule for coalition payoffs, called optimal sharing which … cartel if spillovers are negative. I introduce a new property, called non-essentiality and determine the set of stable … cartels under optimal sharing if spillovers are positive and if the non-essentiality property applies. Finally I analyse …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014064613
A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008677116
A universal type space of interdependent expected utility preference types is constructed from higher-order preference hierarchies describing (i) an agent's (unconditional) preferences over a lottery space; (ii) the agent's preference over Anscombe-Aumann acts conditional on the unconditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854041
We identify a universal type space of possible interdependent (expected utility) preferences of a group of agents satisfying two criteria. First, a type consists of a "detail free" description, in a natural language, of the agents' interdependent preferences. Second, distinct types in the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010895695
This paper studies network formation in settings where players are heterogeneous with respect to benefits as well as the costs of forming links. Our results demonstrate that centrality, center-sponsorship and short network diameter are robust features of equilibrium networks. We find that in a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011256954
The economic catch-up of the East Asian region went hand-in-hand with the emergence and even dominance of large quasi-state or private conglomerates. Such for example were the Zaibatsus in the pre-WWII and the Keiretsus of the post-WWII Japan and the Chaebols of South Korea which enjoyed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011261851
Consider a contest for a prize in which each player knows his own ability, but may or may not know those of his rivals (the complete or incomplete information regimes). Our main result is that, if the value of the prize is high, more e¤ort and output are engendered under incomplete information;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011207075
In this paper we formalize a new form of two-player game, that we call decision- form. A two-player decision-form game consists in a pair of decision rules, representing the rationality of each player. We develop the basic facts of this type of games, showing that this form of game generalizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008855549