The strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action-monotonic games

Investigating the strategic advantage of negatively interdependent preferences in action monotonic games, we derive characterizing conditions both for general action monotonic games and for the subclass of action monotonic games with spillovers. Examples demonstrate the generality of our findings, in particular that the strategic advantage prevails beyond the classes of super- and submodular games. The application of two-player rent-seeking contests illustrates how our criteria simplify analyzing the strategic advantage.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Hehenkamp, Burkhard
Publisher:	Dortmund : Universität Dortmund, Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Fakultät
Subject:	strategic advantage \| interdependent preferences \| spillovers \| action monotonicity

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Series:	Wirtschaftstheoretische Diskussionsbeiträge ; 05-05
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	611993929 [GVK] hdl:10419/39435 [Handle]
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; C79 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. Other
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270831