This paper studies communication mechanisms for two players with symmetric single-peaked preferences. The peaks are privately known and drawn from a uniform distribution before the agents take a collective decision. While for the general setting Moulin (1980) characterized all strategy-proof...

Markets for credit default swaps (CDS) and bonds of the same reference entity and maturity are bound by no-arbitrage conditions. Indeed, using a large data set we show that CDS premia and par asset swap spreads are mostly cointegrated. Nonetheless, the average CDS-bond basis (i.e. the difference...

We analyze the effects of unionization on the decision of a firm to either produce at home or abroad. We consider a model in which home and foreign workers are perfect substitutes and firms have an informational advantage concerning their productivity. The union offers wage-employment contracts...

The aim of this paper is to test therelevance of considering private fixed transaction costsfor contract design of Agri-Environmental Schemes,when transaction costs are negatively correlated tomarginal compliance costs. In order to do so, aprincipal-agent model of contract design under...

The aim of this paper is to test the relevance of considering private fixed transaction costs for contract design of Agri-Environmental Schemes, when transaction costs are negatively correlated to marginal compliance costs. In order to do so, a principal-agent model of contract design under...

This paper considers the screening problem faced by a monopolist of a network good in a general setting. We demonstrate that the joint presence of asymmetric information and network externalities revise the "no distortion on the top" and "one-way distortion" principle. The pattern of consumption...

We analyze the effects of unionization on the decision of a firm to either produce at home or abroad. We consider a model in which home and foreign workers are perfect substitutes and firms have an informational advantage concerning their productivity. The union offers wage-employment contracts...

In this paper we propose a simple method of characterizing countervailing incentives in adverse selection problems. The key element in our characterization consists of analyzing properties of the full information problem. This allows solving the principal problem without using optimal control...

This paper examines the influence of type-dependent reservation utility on the optimality of linear contracts in a Principal-Agent model of procurement. Type-dependency of reservation utility, combined with the requirements of individual rationality and incentive compatibility in the principal's...

I study the optimal project choice when the principal relies on the agent in charge of production for project evaluation. The principal has to choose between a safe project generating a fixed revenue and a risky project generating an uncertain revenue. The agent has private information about the...