We study optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire-building tendency …

We determine the optimal contract for the regulation of a bureaucratic firm in the case in which the bureaucratic bias …

We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency …

We study the optimal regulation of a monopolist when intrinsic efficiency (intrinsic cost) and empire building tendency …

We study regulation of a bureaucratic provider of a public good in the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection …

that might fail to deliver. The buyer conducts a procurement auction to determine contract suppliers and can choose between … plays an important role in procurement practice but attracted little attention in the academic analysis of procurement … auctions. Academic research on multi-sourcing procurement auction typically analyzes these auctions as stand-alone events. In …

We develop a model to discuss a government's incentives to delegate to bureaucrats the regulation of an industry. The …-based regulation policy requires the government to make use of a bureaucracy; this has a bureaucratic cost, as the bureaucracy diverts … implications for when and how a government should delegate its regulation of industry. We find that bureaucratic discretion reduces …

that might fail to deliver. The buyer conducts a procurement auction to determine contract suppliers and can choose between … plays an important role in procurement practice but attracted little attention in the academic analysis of procurement … auctions. Academic research on multi-sourcing procurement auction typically analyzes these auctions as stand-alone events. In …

rationally makes a heightened winner's curse correction in a procurement auction. Hence lower-cost suppliers are …