, strategy-proofness, and unanimity, with and without anonymity, are decomposable on non-dictatorial single-peaked voting domains. …Random mechanisms have been used in real-life situations for reasons such as fairness. Voting and matching are two …, strategy-proofness, unanimity, and feasibility together are not totally unimodular in collective choice environments in general …

the only one satisfying anonymity, neutrality, and strategy-proofness (SP). For more than two alternatives, anonymity and … concepts in an intuitive manner. Dropping anonymity and keeping neutrality, we identify and analyze the first known nontrivial … family of K-SP rules, namely semi-dictator rules. For two agents, semi-dictator rules are characterized by local unanimity …

the stability of social choice. This concept involves a weakening of unanimity, the most extreme form of consensus. It is …

In a voting model where the set of feasible alternatives is a subset of a product set $A = A_1\times …