Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability
Year of publication: |
May 2016
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Authors: | Arribillaga, R. Pablo ; Massó, Jordi |
Published in: |
Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in economic theory. - Toronto : [Verlag nicht ermittelbar], ISSN 1555-7561, ZDB-ID 2220447-7. - Vol. 11.2016, 2, p. 547-586
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Subject: | Generalized median voting schemes | strategy-proofness | anonymity | Soziale Wohlfahrtsfunktion | Social welfare function | Theorie | Theory | Neue politische Ökonomie | Public choice | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Medianwähler-Modell | Median voter |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE1910 [DOI] hdl:10419/150286 [Handle] |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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